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GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK FOCUS:
FACTS ON THE GROUND
paul mcculley
Double-entry bookkeeping was a great invention. It is a shame that so many macroeconomists
and political pundits—and,therefore, politicians themselves—seem to have forgotten it. One who
hasn’t is the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf. And to the delight of all friends of the Levy Economics
Institute, Martin cited in a recent column1 the financial balances approach of the late Wynne
Godley, who spent his last years as a Distinguished Scholar at Levy. 
Godley’s analytical framework should be the workhorse of discussions of global rebalancing,
in the context of a deficiency of global aggregate demand. So, it was wonderful to see Martin rid-
ing Godley’s horse. I’ll walk you through it, but first the punch line: front-loaded fiscal austerity
in countries with their own fiat currencies is unwarranted and is likely to have deleterious, defla-
tionary effects on the global economy. How so?
Let’s start with a simple tautology for any individual country:
Household Financial Balance + 
Business Financial Balance +
Government Financial Balance +
Foreign Financial Balance = 0
Again, double-entry bookkeeping: the only way that one of the four sectors can run a deficit
or surplus is for one or more of the other three sectors to run the opposite. This assertion doesn’t,of course, tell us anything about causation. Nor does it tell us
about the composition or the sustainability of the starting posi-
tions for global stocks of debt and assets. It’s simply the tyranny
of arithmetic for the flow of funds.
Right now, the household and business sectors in the devel-
oped world are running huge financial surpluses, in contrast to
the opposite three years ago. In contrast, developed-country
governments are running larger deficits. Meanwhile, the emerg-
ing world is running a still-large financial surplus with the
developed world. Figure 1 tells the story for the United States:  
Thus, any notion that fiscal austerity in the developed
world will not be a cyclical drag on global aggregate demand
growth, much less boost it, must rest on the presumption that
(1) the household and business sectors in the developed world
will reduce their surpluses and/or (2) that the emerging world
will reduce its surpluses with the developed world. 
Reverse-Ricardian Austerians
Why do so many implicitly make that presumption? With regard
to reducing private sector surpluses in the developed world, it’s
called reverse-Ricardian equivalence. Recall, Ricardian equiva-
lence is the notion that governmental deficits cause the private
sector to increase its surpluses, so as to save for the future
increase in taxes that inevitably will be required to reduce the
government deficits. Thus, current evangelists of front-loaded
fiscal austerity preach that if only governments would reduce
their deficits, the private sector, freed from the fear of future tax
increases, would spontaneously reduce their surpluses. Put dif-
ferently, it is argued, if only governments would put their fiscal
houses in order, the private sector would immaculately regain
confidence in their own financial affairs, pull down their savings,
and borrow more, boosting aggregate demand. Really, that is the
argument, made with a straight face. 
But it conveniently ignores why the private sector in the
developed world is running a financial surplus: deflated asset
prices, which have undermined the debt that had been applied
to inflated asset prices. The private sector in the developed world
wants to get its financial house in order! This is a profound
structural change, running in parallel to a permanent downsiz-
ing of the shadow banking system and derisking of the conven-
tional banking system. Simply put, both the demand and supply
curves for private sector credit creation have shifted inward.
And the only way that can happen without increasing the
risk of a deflationary depression is either for the developed-
country governments to continue to run large financial deficits
and/or for the emerging countries to reduce their financial sur-
pluses. Again, the tyranny of arithmetic.
Thus, siren calls for front-loaded fiscal austerity in the
developed world are de facto a bet that the emerging world is
politically, financially, and culturally ready to dramatically
reduce its financial surplus with the developed world, to shift
dramatically away from a mercantilist-grounded growth model
of exports to one based more on domestic demand, fueled by
falling private sector savings rates. In the long run, such a struc-
tural change is obviously in the best interest of the emerging mar-
kets, letting their citizens enjoy the fruits of their own productivity
rather than shipping those fruits to the developed world, taking
back fiat currency paper in a vendor finance arrangement.And it
is very likely to happen. But the time frame will not be a cycli-
cal one, but a secular—if not supersecular—one. 
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Figure 1 U.S. Main Sector Balances, 1985–2010























Note: Summation may not foot to exact zero balance due to cyclical
statistical discrepencies.
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Accordingly, it is most disheartening to hear born-again
cyclical fiscal austerians2 tout the notion that somehow there
will not be a deflationary negative shock to global aggregate
demand, if their course is followed. Paul Krugman gets even
more worked up than Martin Wolf about this, or at least is more
colorful in expressing his disdain in regular missives in the New
York Times and in his blogs. But Martin is stepping up his game,
declaring that the austerians’ reverse-Ricardian cyclical path to
salvation may be right, musing that “the moon may be made of
green cheese, too.”
And it is not surprising that both Paul and Martin are lift-
ing the level of their Keynesian/Godley vitriol. Current fiscal
deficits in fiat currency countries are not the cause of the Great
Recession but the consequence of the Great Recession, which
was the consequence of the blowing up of asset price bubbles
and Ponzi debt arrangements in the private sector. If current
fiscal deficits had not been allowed to unfold, the Great
Recession would now be the Great Depression 2.0.  
Today, the putative bond market vigilantes are not wrapped
around the axle about fiscal deficits in fiat currency countries, or
for that matter in the northern countries that are members of the
European Monetary Union (who de facto control the European
Central Bank [ECB]). Indeed, their sovereign bonds are in great
demand at low yields, just as should logically be expected when
the developed-world private sector is running ever larger finan-
cial surpluses. Fiscal deficits are not crowding out private sector
borrowing because the private sector doesn’t want to borrow.
Rather, fiscal deficits are facilitating the private sector’s desire to
save more, delevering their balance sheets. Remember, the gov-
ernment sector’s liability is the private sector’s asset! 
But, you retort, the private sector is ultimately on the hook
for the government’s liabilities, so how can those liabilities be
considered the private sector’s asset? Simple: they can be sold
for hard, cold cash. To be sure, someday the government’s debt
must be rolled over, or retired. But in real time, government
securities are assets of the private sector (or the foreign sector).
And for a fiat currency country, there is no reason to think that
the debt cannot be rolled over, as such countries have a technol-
ogy called a money printing press. 
To be sure, using the printing press in the context of full
employment would tend to generate higher inflation. But in the
context of full employment, fiscal deficits would be dramati-
cally lower—nothing like getting the unemployed off the dole
and onto the tax rolls to cut fiscal deficits! And the developed
world is a long, long way from full employment. Thus, front-
loaded fiscal austerity makes absolutely no sense, unless you
believe that Ricardo was right and that the private sector in the
developed world has no balance sheet problems, only fear of
future taxes. And that the moon is made of green cheese.
Bottom Line
What the developed world faces is a cyclical deficiency of aggre-
gate demand, the product of a liquidity trap and the paradox of
thrift, in the context of headwinds born of ongoing structural
realignments. Front-loaded fiscal austerity would only add to
that deflationary cocktail. And that’s what the market vigilantes
are wrapped around the axle about: they are not fleeing the sov-
ereign debt of fiat currency countries but rather fleeing risk
assets, which depend on growth for valuation support. 
To be sure, the vigilantes have fled Greece, but Greece does
not have a fiat currency; Greece is a risk asset,and all risk assets
depend upon growth for valuation support. And fiscal austerity
is not the path to growth if everybody wants to do it at the same
time. The risk-asset vigilantes, who rightfully fear fiscal auster-
ity–induced deflation, are in charge, not the bond market vigi-
lantes of our youth, who feared fiscal profligacy–induced inflation. 
These, my friends, are the facts on the ground. And they are
not made easier by the reality of higher structural unemploy-
ment and a permanent reduction in the capacity for private sec-
tor credit creation in the developed world. What is more,
secular fiscal positions in the developed world are bedeviled by
the need to reduce and reorder fiscal expenditures associated
with aging demographics. Longer term, a successful breakout
phase in emerging economies offers much hope for stronger,
better balanced global growth.
But cyclically speaking, current fiscal deficits in fiat currency
countries are a blessing, not a curse. So, if you are cursing the
lousy performance of your risk-asset portfolio, do not blame fear
of fiscal deficits in fiat currency countries. Rather, blame fear of
the austerians’ desires to cyclically do something about them.
Notes
1.  See Martin Wolf, “Why Plans for Early Fiscal Tightening
Carry Global Risks.” Financial Times, June 17, 2010.
2.  Hats off to my friend and fellow Hy Minsky follower Rob
Parenteau for recently coining this delightful word. 